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Abstract—Low probability of detection (LPD) communication
has recently emerged as a new transmission technology to address
privacy and security in wireless networks. Recent studies have es-
tablished the fundamental limits of LPD communication in terms
of the amount of information bits that can be conveyed from a
transmitter to a receiver subject to a constraint on a warden’s
detection error probability. The established information-theoretic
metric enables analytical studies on the design and performance
of LPD communication under various channel conditions. In
this article, we present the key features of LPD communication
and discuss various important design considerations. Firstly, we
clarify the differences between LPD communication and the
well-known physical-layer security. Then, from an information-
theoretic point of view, we discuss the optimal signalling strategies
for transmitting the message-carrying signal and artificial-noise
signal for LPD communication. Finally, we identify the key chal-
lenges in the design of practical LPD communication systems and
point out future research directions in this context. This article
provides guidelines for designing practical LPD communication
strategies in wireless systems and networks.
Index Terms—Covert communication, low probability of de-
tection communication, physical layer security, wireless commu-
nication security.
I. INTRODUCTION
As fifth generation (5G) wireless networks together with
the Internet of Things (IoT) are brought to reality, people and
organizations become more dependent on wireless devices to
share secure and private information (e.g., location, physiolog-
ical information for e-health). One impediment to widespread
adoption of these technologies are people’s concerns about
security and privacy of wireless communications. For example,
the exposure of an embedded medical device’s transmission
may indicate the sickness of a user and may disclose the user’s
location, which may violate the privacy of the user and is not
allowed by the user. To guarantee a strong security or privacy,
it is often not sufficient to only protect the content of commu-
nications, but it is also required to hide the very existence of
wireless transmissions [1]. Hiding wireless transmissions may
also be explicitly desired by government and military bodies
(e.g., for a stealth fighter to be able to hide itself from enemies
while communicating with its military bases). However, there
is a lack of understanding on the performance limit and
enabling technologies for hiding the existence of wireless
communications, since current cryptographic and physical-
layer security technologies protect only content (i.e., what is
transmitted) of wireless communications [2], [3].
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Hiding wireless transmissions was partially addressed by
spread spectrum as the only existing solution in practical
use cases. Spread spectrum was invented a century ago with
the original purpose of hiding military wireless transmissions
(e.g., by spreading transmit power into noise). However, the
fundamental performance limit of hiding wireless transmission
by spread spectrum has not been fully analyzed, which leads
to the fact that there was no clear understanding on when or
how often spread spectrum fails to hide wireless transmissions.
As such, the amount of covertness achieved by spread spec-
trum has not been fully revealed. Due to the unproven and
unguaranteed performance, the main use of spread spectrum
deviated from hiding wireless transmissions to obtaining high
reliability and high data rate in the last two decades. Motivated
by the ever-increasing desire of a strong security, cutting-edge
research on wireless communication security has called for a
rethinking and generalization of spread spectrum (for security
purposes) at a more fundamental level, which inspires the
emergence of a new security paradigm termed low probability
of detection (LPD) communication. Research on LPD commu-
nication focuses on the fundamental limits of hiding wireless
transmissions, in terms of the amount of information that can
be conveyed covertly from a transmitter Alice to a legitimate
receiver Bob subject to a specific probability of being detected
by a warden Willie [1], [4].
Recent research on LPD communication aims at the poten-
tial integration of LPD communication techniques into current
and future wireless networks, e.g., 5G wireless networks and
IoT, to protect the privacy and security of served users. LPD
communication technology is also critical to government and
military bodies. For instance, with an increasing cybercrime
throughout the world, the police or military units desire to
detect communications between any potential cybercriminals,
since the presence (not necessarily the content) of such com-
munications offers sufficient alarm for the government bodies
or military units to take action. Research in this area will
provide a thorough understanding of LPD communication,
which can enable the government to (i) enhance national
security through foreseeing any future fortunate or devastating
impact of this technology on our national cybersecurity, and
(ii) understand how to regulate the use of this new technology
in future wireless communications.
LPD communication technology has drawn significant re-
search interests since 2013 [4]. Existing research in this
field can be broadly categorized into three main directions
with overlaps. The first category focuses characterizing the
performance limits of LPD communication (e.g., [5]), which
aims to disclose the number of information bits that can be
2conveyed with a negligible detection probability. The second
one is on encoding schemes to achieve LPD communica-
tion, focusing on constructing practical encoding schemes
and characterizing the required key size in order to achieve
the LPD communication limits (e.g., [6]). The third category
on LPD communication performance enhancements targets at
examining possibilities and developing techniques to improve
LPD communication performance in realistic environments.
Although the limited preliminary work in each category has
provided some initial understanding on LPD communication,
many challenging problems and issues have not been ad-
dressed. Against this background, in this article we first discuss
the fundamental features of LPD communication and provide
a comparison with a closely related technology of physical-
layer security. We will then highlight some existing research
results of LPD communication, further identify significant
challenging problems and issues in designing practical LPD
communication systems, and finally provide our recommen-
dations on future research directions in LPD communication.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we introduce the key features of LPD communication
and compare it with physical-layer security techniques from
the aspects of fundamental frameworks, performance metrics,
and mathematical tools. Some important research results and
existing open problems on the optimization of signalling
strategies and artificial interference in LPD communication
are discussed in Section III. Then, we discuss how wireless
engineers can apply traditional communication techniques
(e.g., modulation, channel coding) to LPD communication in
Section IV. Section V concludes this article.
II. EXISITING MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON LPD
COMMUNICATION AND ITS KEY DIFFERENCES RELATIVE
TO PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY
In this section, we first present a motivation scenario for
LPD communication and some main conclusions in this re-
search direction. Then, we clarify the differences between LPD
communication and physical-layer security.
A. A Prisoner’s LPD Communication Problem and Spread
Spectrum
In wireless networks, LPD communication problem can
be described using a prisoner’s communication scenario as
shown in Fig. 1, where a prisoner Alice intends to transmit
critical information to a receiver Bob subject to a negligible
probability of being detected by the guard Willie. In this
scenario, the guard does not care what Alice transmits and
he would take off Alice’s phone as long as he detects her
transmission. As such, from Willie’s perspective, he is going
to detect whether Alice’s wireless transmission occurs or not,
which is a binary detection problem. Meanwhile, from Alice’s
perspective, she has to hide her wireless transmission to Bob
in order to avoid losing her phone.
Spread spectrum was actually used widely to hide military
wireless communication during World War II. However, the
fundamental performance limit of spread spectrum, in terms of
the amount of information that can be transferred covertly with
Fig. 1. A wireless LPD communication scenario, where a prisoner Alice
tries to send critical information to a receiver Bob subject to a negligible
probability of being detected by the guard Willie.
a certain covertness level, was unknown. Without such limit
analysis, we cannot answer many questions with regard to the
fundamental performance limit of spread spectrum in terms of
the achieved covertness, e.g., “What is the probability of being
detected if Alice transmits a certain amount of information
(e.g., a photo of a certain size) within a specific period?”
and “Given a maximum tolerance level on the probability
of being detected (e.g., 0.5%), how much information can
Alice transmit with a certain amount of time?”. Tackling these
questions motivated the emergence of LPD communication,
aiming at analyzing the fundamental limits of hiding wireless
transmissions. LPD communication technology can hide the
very existence of wireless transmissions with proven perfor-
mance and thus can mitigate the threat of discovering the
presence of a user or communication to achieve a strong
security of ever-increasing demand in wireless civilian and
military networks.
B. Square Root Law and Its Extension in LPD Communication
A square root law was derived in [4] by considering additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels for both Bob and
Willie, which states that no more than O(√n) bits can be
conveyed reliably from Alice to Bob in n channel uses while
lower-bounding Willie’s detection error probability of this
transmission being no less than a specific value ǫ. After [4],
the scaling constant of the amount of covert information with
respect to
√
n was characterized for a discrete memoryless
channel (DMC) and the AWGN channel in [6]. The achiev-
ability of the square root law normally requires pre-shared
secrecies between Alice and Bob prior to Alice’s transmission.
For DMCs, this key size was shown to be on the order of
√
n
to achieve the square root law regardless of the quality of the
channels [5]. In addition, this pre-shared secret was proven to
be unnecessary when the channel quality from Alice to Bob
is higher than that from Alice to Willie [5]. We note that the
square root law, which leads to zero covert rate, may not hold
in all channel models. For example, the work [7] showed that
3non-zero covert rate is achievable in queuing timing channels,
where a sufficiently high rate secret key is available. This also
demonstrates the tradeoff between the required key size and
the achievable covertness in LPD communication.
C. LPD Communication with the Aid of Artificial Noise
The performance of LPD communication can be effec-
tively improved by the transmission strategies with the aid
of artificial noise (AN) [8], [9]. It was shown that LPD
communication with O(n) bits over n channel uses could be
achieved when a uniformly distributed “jammer” is present to
help the transmitter Alice in AWGN and block fading channels
[8]. Besides external jammers, AN transmitted by a full-duplex
receiver Bob can enable LPD communication and significantly
improve its performance [9]. Specifically, it was shown that
the transmission of AN with varying power, although causing
self-interference at Bob, provides the opportunity of achieving
covertness without other uncertainties at Willie in fading
channels, where it was demonstrated that the transmit power
range of AN should be managed carefully in order to enhance
LPD communication.
D. LPD Communication in Random Wireless Networks
The ultimate goal of LPD communication is to achieve
shadow wireless networks [1]. Preliminary results towards
this goal have been achieved in the context of random
wireless networks. LPD communication with a Poisson field
of interferers was analyzed in [10], which drew interesting
conclusions with regard to the impact of interferers. Firstly, it
showed that the density and transmit power of the concurrent
interferers do not affect the covert throughput when the
network stays in the interference-limited regime. When the
interference is proportional to the receiver noise, the covert
throughput increases with the density and transmit power of
the interferers. In addition to interferers, the work of [11]
considered randomly located wardens in LPD communication
with centralized and distributed transmit antennas at Alice.
It drew a similar conclusion as [10], i.e., the maximum
covert throughput is invariant to the density or transmit power
of interferers regardless of the transmit antenna number or
locations (centralized or distributed).
E. Multi-Hop LPD Communication
Another preliminary step towards achieving shadow wire-
less networks is the research work on multi-hop routing in
LPD communication [12]. The covertness requirement in LPD
communication highly limits its communication range and
thus multi-hop communication is desired in shadow wireless
networks. Against this background, [12] considered multi-hop
routing with multiple relays to achieve a long-distance LPD
communication from Alice to Bob. The maximum throughput
and minimum end-to-end delay in the presence of multiple
collaborating wardens were achieved in two cases, where a
single key or multiple independent keys were used at the
relays, respectively. The results in [12] show that multi-
hop transmission significantly improve the performance of
Fig. 2. System models of (a) low probability of detection (LPD) communi-
cation and (b) physical-layer security.
LPD communication relative to the single-hop transmission.
Furthermore, their results showed that the case with multiple
independent keys outperforms that with a single key, which in-
dicates the tradeoff between system complexity (and overhead
cost) and the LPD communication performance.
F. Delay-Intolerant LPD Communication
Most works in the literature of LPD communication con-
sider the number of channel uses being large or asymptotically
infinite, which leads to large communication delay. Motivated
by some delay-intolerant applications, the work [13] inves-
tigated delay-intolerant LPD communication, which showed
that under a specific delay constraint the transmission should
occur within all the available channel uses in order to maxi-
mize the effective amount of information that can be conveyed
covertly from Alice to Bob. Random transmit power was also
considered in [13], which drew another general conclusion
in LPD communication. That is, as long as the uncertainty
is not zero, it can be increases by some strategy, which
turns out to improve the performance of LPD communication.
This conclusion was also confirmed by the work [14], which
showed that AN transmitted with a fixed power (not a varying
one) can enhance the delay-intolerant LPD communication.
G. Differences between LPD Communication and Physical-
Layer Security
Researchers from the physical-layer security community
have started to see LPD communication as a closely related
technology for achieving security. Nevertheless, there are
fundamental differences between LPD communication and
physical-layer security. To clarify these differences, we first
present their fundamental features, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
From this figure, we can see that the main difference between
LPD communication and physical-layer security is in the
nature of the malicious user. This malicious user in LPD com-
munication is the warden Willie, who cares whether the trans-
mitter Alice transmits information to the legitimate receiver
Bob. This is also the reason that it is a communication channel
from Alice to Bob, while it is a detection channel from Alice
to Willie. Meanwhile, the malicious user in physical-layer
security is the eavesdropper Eve, who intends to know what
Alice transmits to Bob [2], [3]. In physical-layer security, the
channel from Alice to Bob is the main channel and the channel
from Alice to Eve is the eavesdropper’s channel, which both
4are for communications. Mathematically, Willie is dealing with
a binary detection problem in LPD communication, while Eve
is facing a communication problem in physical-layer security.
III. ON THE INFORMATION-THEORETIC OPTIMALITY OF
SIGNALLING
IN LPD COMMUNICATION
In this section, from an information-theoretic point of view,
we first discuss the optimality of Gaussian signalling in LPD
communication. Then, we identify challenging research prob-
lems with regard to the optimality of the AN or interference
when such noise or interference is controllable.
A. Optimality of Gaussian Signalling in LPD Communication
In communication theory, it is known that Gaussian sig-
nalling (i.e., the transmitted signal follows a normal distri-
bution) is optimal for traditional point-to-point communica-
tion in terms of maximizing the mutual information between
the input and output in AWGN channels. Following this
conclusion, a straightforward question is whether Gaussian
signalling is optimal in LPD communication. Tackling this
question with Willie’s minimum detection error probability
being no less than a specific value as the covertness con-
straint is very challenging, since this error probability is
mathematically intractable before determining the distribution
of Alice’s transmitted signal [15]. We note that Willie’s
minimum detection error probability equals to one minus
the total variation VT (p0 , p1) between the likelihood function
p
0
under the null hypothesis and the likelihood function p
1
under the alternative hypothesis. However, VT (p0 , p1) is also
mathematically intractable in most scenarios [4]. Meanwhile,
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence offers tight bounds on
VT (p0 , p1) and this KL divergence can be expressed in ana-
lytical expressions. Thus, the KL divergence has been widely
used in the literature of LPD communication to set tractable
covertness constraints [15]. Due to the asymmetry property
of KL divergence, we can use either D(p
0
||p
1
) or D(p
1
||p
0
)
to determine a covertness constraint, where D(p
0
||p
1
) is the
KL divergence p
0
to p
1
and D(p
1
||p
0
) is the KL divergence
from p
1
to p
0
. It is shown that Gaussian signalling is optimal
in terms of maximizing the mutual information between the
input and output of the communication channel subject to the
covertness constraint determined by D(p
1
||p
0
). This is due
to the fact that the normal p
1
can simultaneously maximize
the considered mutual information and minimizing D(p
1
||p
0
)
as proved in [15]. However, we note that Gaussian signalling
is not optimal when the covertness constraint is determined
by D(p
0
||p
1
), since the normal p
1
cannot minimize D(p
0
||p
1
)
while maximizing the mutual information. As shown in [15], a
skew-normal p
1
can achieve a lower D(p
0
||p
1
), which leads to
the result that a skew-normal p
1
can possibly outperform the
normal p
1
in the context of LPD communication. Following
this, a challenging and information-theoretic research problem
in LPD communication is “What is the optimal signalling
strategy in the LPD communication with the covertness con-
straint determined by D(p
0
||p
1
)?”.
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Fig. 3. Mutual information between the input and output of the communi-
cation channel versus VT (p0 , p1) in LPD communication, where AWGN at
Bob and Willie are independent and identically distributed.
In [15], it is also numerically demonstrated that Gaussian
signalling is still not optimal when the covertness constraint
is actually based on VT (p0 , p1), which is also shown in
Fig. 3. In this figure, we observe that for a given value of
VT (p0 , p1) the skew-normal p1 can achieve a higher mutual
information. This is due to the fact that the skew-normal p
1
can lead to a smaller VT (p0 , p1) than the normal p1 , although
skew-normal p
1
cannot achieve a higher mutual information
than the normal p
1
. This observation indicates that Gaussian
signalling is not optimal in practical LPD communication.
Against this background, examining the optimal signal strategy
in practical LPD communication deserves much near future
research effort.
Based on the above discussions, we know that Gaussian
signalling is not optimal in practical LPD communication,
since it cannot optimally hide the transmitted signal from the
Warden Willie, although it achieves the best communication
performance from the transmitter Alice to the receiver Bob.
This provides two possibilities on the optimal signalling
strategy in LPD communication. The first one is that the
optimal signalling may be the one that can optimally hide
the transmitted signal in terms of maximizing the detection
error probability at Willie. The other one is that the optimal
signalling can be the tradeoff between the one optimally hides
transmitted signal and the one optimizes the communication
from Alice to Bob. These two possibilities deserve future
ongoing research effort, which will facilitate clarifying how
the transmit signal is optimally hidden while carrying the
maximum useful information.
B. Optimality of Artificial Noise and Interference in LPD
Communication
Considering finite channel uses, AN or interference with
a fixed power can enhance LPD communication (e.g., [13],
[14]). In this case, the distributions of the AN and interference
can be optimized to maximize the communication channel
mutual information subject to the performance limits of the
5detection channel. This optimization is a challenging research
problem, since general expressions for the distributions of Bob
and Willie’s received signals are hard or infeasible to achieve
for a given distribution of the AN or interference. Following
the work [15], we note that calculus of variations may serve
as the main mathematical tools for solving such optimization
problems. In addition to directly optimizing AN or interfer-
ence, the impact of information-theoretic (IT) coding with
finite blocklength should be considered in this optimization,
since IT coding not only affects the detection performance at
the warden Willie, but also has direct impact on the decoding
error probability at the receiver Bob.
In the case with infinite channel uses, the transmit power
of such AN or interference should be randomized in order
to enhance LPD communication [9]. Along this direction,
future research effort should be on identifying the optimal
distribution of the transmit power for the AN or interference
subject to practical constraints (e.g., maximum transmit power
constraint) in this case. In existing works, the transmit power
distribution of AN or interference is typically set to follow a
uniform distribution as an arbitrary choice (e.g., [9]).
IV. PRACTICAL DESIGN CHALLENGES AND OPEN
RESEARCH PROBLEMS IN LPD COMMUNICATION
LPD communication is to hide the transmission from the
warden Willie while conveying as much information as possi-
ble from the transmitter Alice to the receiver Bob. Relative to
traditional wireless communications, the new aspect of LPD
communication is to hide wireless transmission from Willie,
i.e., the covertness constraint. The principle of achieving this
covertness is to make the detection of Alice’s transmission
hard for Willie. To this end, in designing practical LPD com-
munication we have to keep non-zero uncertainty in Willie’s
binary detection and increase this uncertainty by all means.
In the following, we clarify some challenges in designing
practical LPD communication systems and present potential
future research directions in LPD communication.
A. Modulation
Achieving LPD communication usually means that Alice’s
transmit power needs to be small, thus Bob’s signal reception
experiences low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). As such, the
detection and throughput performance of different modulation
schemes in the low SNR regime is of great importance. In the
low SNR regime, low-order modulation performs better than
high-order modulation. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that in
the low SNR regime a low-order modulation (corresponding to
the low information rate without considering channel coding)
can provide a higher reliability than a high-order modulation.
To confirm this, in Fig. 4 we plot the achieved throughput of
four different modulation schemes, i.e., Binary Phase Shift
Keying (BPSK), Quadrature PSK (QPSK), 8PSK, and 16-
Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (16QAM), versus SNR per
bit, where the throughput is defined as the product of the
rate of each modulation scheme and the corresponding bit
success rate (that is, one minus bit error rate). In this figure,
we observe that modulation schemes with lower modulation
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Fig. 4. Throughput achieved by four different modulation schemes, i.e.,
BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, and 16QAM, versus bit SNR.
orders achieve favourable performance in the low SNR regime.
On the other hand, for detection at Willie, as the modulation
order becomes higher, the received signal statistically follows
a mixture distribution with more components. As per the
central limit theorem, this mixture distribution approaches to a
Gaussian distribution as the number of components increases,
which generally leads to a higher detection error probability at
Willie. As such, a modulation with a higher order for Alice’s
transmission to Bob makes it harder for Willie to detect this
transmission. Following this and considering the performance
of different modulation schemes in the low SNR regime, there
exists an optimal modulation scheme for LDP communications
under some specific conditions. In this context, determining
these conditions and the corresponding optimal modulation
scheme are future research directions of significant impor-
tance. We note that these conditions and the choice of the
optimal modulation scheme will be highly dependent on the
covertness requirements.
B. Channel Coding
Apart from the nontrivial tradeoff in modulation order,
the use of channel coding in Alice’s transmission can also
be a double-edged sword. It is well known that channel
coding can improve communication reliability by adding ex-
tra redundancy into transmitted information bits. The added
redundancy also increases the number of received symbols
or samples at Willie (i.e., increasing the chance for Willie to
detect Alice’s transmission) when Alice transmits a certain
amount of information. As such, examining the conditions
under which channel coding enhances the performance of LPD
communication deserves future research effort. Furthermore,
the relative performance of different channel coding schemes
in LPD communication may differ from that in traditional
wireless communications, which also serves as another future
research direction in this context. Finally, we note that channel
coding with finite blocklength is different from that with
sufficiently large blocklength, which serves as an independent
research direction in the context of LPD communication. This
6Fig. 5. An application scenario of multi-hop low probability of detection
(LPD) communication.
is due to the fact that with finite blocklength the decoding
error probability at the receiver Bob is not negligible anymore
and the coding strategy should simultaneously consider Bob’s
decoding error probability and Willie’s detection performance.
This research direction is challenging but has the most prac-
tical impact, since the communication delay (and thus the
blocklength) is finite in any practical scenario.
C. Channel State Information
In LPD communication, a question to answer before con-
ducting channel estimation is whether channel state informa-
tion (CSI) should be estimated at all. In other words, com-
parison between a coherent communication (which requires
CSI at the receiver) and a fully non-coherent communication
(which does not require CSI at the receiver) in the context of
LPD communication is needed. As such, one needs to analyze
the performance of non-coherent and coherent communica-
tions in the context of LPD communication. Non-coherent
transmission (e.g., differential phase shift keying) does not
require channel training and thus it does not give any reference
signal for Willie to perform detection, which leads to the
possibility that the non-coherent transmission outperforms the
coherent one in the context of LPD communication. In order
to reveal the performance of coherent communication in LPD
communication, one has to develop novel and robust channel
training schemes to enable coherent covert transmissions,
where optimal resource allocation should be considered.
D. Multi-Hop Communications
The low-power nature of LPD communication significantly
restricts the communication range. Therefore, multi-hop com-
munication is essential in many applications of LPD com-
munication where the end-to-end communication distance is
large [1], [12]. In Fig. 5, we show an application scenario
of multi-hop LPD communication, where single-hop commu-
nications cannot achieve enough covertness. This is due to
the fact that the communication distance is large and thus
the transmit power should be high to support such a long-
distance communication. A high transmit power makes it easy
for a nearby detector to detect this communication and thus the
single-hop communication cannot achieve much covertness.
The tradeoff between the communication distance of each
hop and the number of hops in achieving long-distance LPD
communication has never been analyzed. Specifically, whether
more short-distance hops or fewer long-distance hops are
desired in LPD communication is not known. In addition to the
tradeoff between the number of hops and each hop distance,
a novel framework to study the scalability of multi-hop LPD
communication is needed to establish covert and inherently
secure large-scale wireless networks. In this context, another
future research direction is to design practical transmission
strategies to achieve acceptable scaling behavior of LPD
communication performance with respect to the density of
legitimate transceivers or wardens, taking into account the
realistic spatial characteristics of wireless channels.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The LPD communication technology can be used to safe-
guard commercial, government, and military wireless networks
by hiding the very existence of wireless transmissions, which
can significantly boost society’s confidence in exchanging con-
fidential data through wireless communications anytime, any-
where. In this article, we first present some main conclusions
in LPD communication and clarified its difference relative
to physical-layer security. We also discussed the optimality
of transmitted information signals, AN, and interference in
LPD communication. Our discussion showed that Gaussian
signalling, which is the optimal signalling distribution for
conventional communications in AWGN channels, is no longer
optimal in LPD communication. Finally, the design challenges
and open problems identified in this article, including aspects
of modulation, channel coding, channel estimation, and multi-
hop communications, provided useful references for future
research directions in LPD communication.
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